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Globalisation, Labour Standards and Economic Development 
Ajit Singh and Ann Zammit 
Preface 
When this chapter was originally written for the Handbook of Globalisation (Michie, 
2003) the burning issue regarding labour standards was the attempt by advanced country 
governments and unions, particularly the US, to establish multilateral rules in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to enforce labour standards globally. This initiative did not 
succeed and the issues raised remain as relevant as ever, though they no longer 
command as much attention at the top of the international policy agenda. This slightly 
revised version therefore retains the basic structure of the arguments presented on 
labour standards in a developmental context. However, in view of the subsequent rise of 
China and India as major producers and exporters and the perception in the US that this 
presents a threat to its workers and industries alike, even the principal cause of its 
industrial and labour woes, this issue is briefly introduced here in an Addendum. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the century the US and other advanced country governments, as well as 
their unions and some parts of the business sector, pressed proposals to establish 
multilateral rules through the World Trade Organization (WTO) permitting punitive 
trade measures to be taken against countries deemed to be failing to uphold core labour 
standards. Their stated objective was to provide a ‘social floor’ to an integrating world 
economy.  Developing countries, the supposed culprits, firmly rebutted these initiatives, 
which they maintained were thinly veiled protectionist devices. The initiative failed. 
Nevertheless, international controversy over labour standards continues.  
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This policy study seeks to shift the debate onto a more constructive plane. Whilst 
closely examining the economic arguments in this controversy, it is also concerned with 
the broader political and moral dimension. The authors suggest that developing 
countries are indeed committed to improving core and other labour standards; the reason 
why, in general, they are unable to implement many of these forthwith and much more 
widely is not because of the wickedness or perversity of their governments or employers 
but essentially because of their economic circumstances, the structure of their 
economies, and the manner in which developing country producers are linked into the 
global production system through global production chains.
1
 It is emphasized that 
developing countries should continue to adhere fully to these commitments both for 
intrinsic developmental reasons and also, importantly, so as not to lose the moral 
argument.  
 
The topics examined below include the effect of developing country trade on labour 
market conditions in the North; the complex relationship between labour standards and 
economic development; the distinction between core and other labour standards and 
whether the core standards may be regarded as basic human rights; the evolution of 
labour standards in the South in response to development and structural changes in these 
economies; the sub-optimality for workers both in the North and South of the use of 
sanctions or other punitive measures to make labour standards compulsory in the 
South.
2
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It is important to appreciate that the following sections have not been thoroughly 
revised in the sense of updating the bibliography. Rather, only those aspects that are 
new to the debate, including those that reflect changes in the nature of globalisation and 
policy implications, are taken further. 
 
II. THE NORTH’S CASE FOR A SOCIAL CLAUSE 
The pressure for adopting measures to compel developing countries to adhere to labour 
standards came in part from workers in the North, particularly those in the US, whose 
perceptions and fears inspired a powerful union campaign spearheaded internationally 
by various international trade union federations. They complain that competition from 
‘cheap labour’, resulting from low labour standards in the South, is unfair. They also 
complain that, unless labour standards are observed in all nations, there will be a ‘race 
to the bottom’ with respect to the terms and conditions of work. (ICFTU, 1999.) Their 
perception is that the generally lower labour standards in the South pose direct threats to 
their own employment, wage levels and bargaining position.
3
 
 
A more specific complaint is that “Unfair competition does not lie simply in the fact 
that labour costs (pay, health and safety requirements, social spending, etc.), are 
extremely low in the South compared with those prevailing in most of Europe; it is also 
that the state often acts to keep wages low by denying workers the rights necessary to 
improve their conditions and by failing to enforce even such legislation as may be on 
their statute books.”4  (Morris, 1994.) Particular targets for criticism have been those 
“countries with development models based on manufacturing for export (and 
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specifically Export Processing Zones) – underpinned by cheap labour, often comprising 
young female workers, and frequent lack of union rights. (ICFTU, 1996.) 
 
It is indeed true that during the 1980s and 1990s labour markets in advanced economies 
displayed unfavourable tendencies, especially compared with the previous two decades 
of the Golden Age. These manifest themselves in three important areas:  de-
industrialisation; increased inequality of wages and incomes; and mass unemployment. 
The following examples suffice to indicate the nature of these deficits in the U.S. and in 
European Union countries. 
 
 During the 100 years before 1973, real average hourly earnings of American 
workers rose by nearly 2 per cent a year. At that rate real earnings doubled 
every 36 years. In other words, the standard of living of each generation of 
workers was double that of the previous one. This longstanding rise in the 
standard of living came to an abrupt end in 1973.
5
 However, over the two 
decades between 1979 and 1998, instead of increasing, the average real 
wage fell.
6
  
 
 At the same time, there was a reversal of the long-term trend towards 
reduced wage and income inequality which had been experienced in the 
couple of decades following the second world war and some say goes back 
as far as the 1920s. (Last sentence not clear) To illustrate, in 1979 male 
workers who had received a college education earned on average 30 per cent 
more than those who only had high-school education. By 1995, the college 
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educated were earning 70 per cent more than those receiving only high 
school education.  Considering only those with high school education, the 
top ten per cent of these workers in terms of wages earned 60 per cent more 
than the average worker in 1979.  By 1995, this wage gap had increased to 
83 per cent. (Slaughter, 1998.) 
 
 Rising inequality was also manifest not just in terms of education, but also 
in terms of experience and other indicators of skill, as indeed in the wage 
structure as a whole.  As mentioned above, the real average hourly wage of 
the average US worker declined continuously between 1979 and 1998; that 
of those workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, that is the lowest 10 
per cent, declined over an even longer period, namely between 1973 and 
1998. Real hourly wages stagnated for all other groups except those in the 
top 10 per cent of the distribution. Even for this top decile, real wages rose 
by a mere 6.6 per cent over the 25 years between 1973 and 1998. (McCall, 
2000.) 
 
 Further, the erosion of trade union power represented another important 
deterioration of labour standards in the US in the 1980s and 1990s. While 
the US claims that its Constitutional guarantees of worker rights and 
freedoms absolves it from signing ILO Conventions, there was widespread 
failure to comply with some of the ILO’s core labour standards.7 Indeed, a 
number of independent studies and government reports indicate that 
American labour law no longer protected workers’ fundamental right to join 
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a union. Instead “unions are involved in a battle in which workers risk losing 
their jobs to realize their rights.”(Kochan, 2000). A number of states passed 
anti-union legislation asserting the “right to work” which has made it more 
difficult to organize a union and for unions to go on strikes.  In addition to 
this encouragement given to non-union plants, the right to organize 
continued to be denied in the agricultural sector, which is among the lowest 
paid. By the early 1990s, only 15 per cent of American workers were 
organized in unions, whose role in protecting and improving the terms and 
conditions of work through collective bargaining became much diminished.
8
 
While the tightening of the labour market in the latter few years of last 
century resulted in a halt to the decline in union membership, at the end of 
the century the United States was still considered to have a relatively 
unregulated regime with regard to labour market issues and what was 
referred to as a “union-avoidance culture.” (Brown, 2000.) 
 
 European workers have had both similar and also different concerns 
compared with US labour. The European welfare state system, despite 
serious attempts by governments and employers to erode the scope of the 
benefits, still provides a floor for the lowest paid workers. However, unlike 
the US, in the 1990s leading West European countries were afflicted by 
mass unemployment. In the popular perception, this was attributed to 
outsourcing by multinationals and, among other important factors, to unfair 
competition from developing countries. 
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 Since the early 1970s, European countries have experienced a high rate of 
increase in unemployment, such that the average level of unemployment rose 
from an average of 2.7 per cent in the period 1964-1973 to10.3 per cent 
between 1990-1999.
9
  In 1995, in France, Italy and the UK the rate was 10 
per cent of the labour force, and in Spain and Finland over 15 per cent. Even 
in Sweden, which previously had maintained a high level of employment, 
the unemployment rate rose rapidly from 1.5 per cent in 1990 to over 10 per 
cent in 1995.
10
  (Singh and Zammit, 1995.) 
 
 While the freedom to associate largely remained intact in Europe, the actual 
strength of trades unions in terms of membership diminished significantly 
and their role in collective bargaining became considerably eroded over the 
final two decades of the century. These changes were an integral part of the 
post-1980 economic order that was rooted in new social norms and which 
involved the unravelling of the social pact between government, employers 
and labour and a weakening of the welfare state. (Singh, 1990.) 
 
 During the period 1980 to 1988, trade union membership declined in all 
countries except Sweden and Finland. In France, trade union membership 
dropped from 19 to 12 per cent, in Italy from 50 to 39 per cent and in the 
Netherlands from 40 to 26 per cent. In the UK, trade union membership fell 
from over 50 per cent to about 33 per cent, covering only one in three 
employees. (Milbank, 1993) 
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The above data regarding trends in the wages and employment of workers in the North 
over the four final decades of the twentieth century provides clear evidence that 
workers’ concerns regarding their worsening position were genuine. A key issue here is 
whether these detrimental developments were due to competition from developing 
countries.  As the analysis below suggests, this was not the case. 
 
Between 2000 and 2007, however, the world economy (including that of the US) 
expanded rapidly, resulting in a fall in the US unemployment rate. In Europe too the 
unemployment rate fell. Subsequently there was a further significant change, this time 
for the worse, as a consequence of the onset of the acute financial and economic crisis 
in 2008 when all economic indicators moved in a negative direction. For reasons of 
space and time this chapter does not provide a detailed analysis of labour issues during 
the initial crisis years. Suffice it to say that unemployment levels rose appreciably in 
both the US and Europe.   
 
III. COMPETITION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LABOUR MARKET 
OUTCOMES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: AN ASSESSMENT 
The labour market difficulties in the advanced countries outlined above are extremely 
important and deserve full consideration. If it were true that trade in manufactures with 
low-wage developing countries was the main cause of increasing inequality in the US or 
of mass unemployment in Europe, this would not bode at all well for constructive 
international co-operation particularly in the economic sphere. In the event, however, 
research, particularly the most recent contributions, indicated that this widespread 
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perception had very little basis.
11
 The important insights of this research may be 
summarized as follows.
12
    
 
 An elementary but extremely important point is that most manufacturing 
trade of the advanced countries takes place between these countries 
themselves. Even at the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century only a 
small part is with developing countries.  It is indeed true that, starting 
from a very low level, the volume of manufactured exports from 
developing countries to advanced countries expanded at a very fast rate 
of 12 per cent a year between 1970 and 1990. Similarly, their share of 
world exports of manufactures increased from just 12 per cent in 1980 to 
25 per cent in 1996.
13
  Nevertheless, despite this impressive increase in 
manufactured exports from developing countries, the total imports by 
advanced countries of manufactured goods from developing countries 
(excluding China) amounted to only about 1.5 per cent of the combined 
GDP of OECD countries. It will therefore be difficult to argue that the 
huge shifts in income inequality and phenomena such as mass 
unemployment in the North are being caused largely by this rather 
marginal amount of trade with the South.
14
 
 
 Another simple but significant fact is that advanced countries, despite 
their increased manufactured imports from developing countries, have 
generally maintained a surplus in manufacturing trade with developing 
countries as a whole. UNCTAD (1995) carried out a comprehensive 
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analysis of North-South trade over two decades – from the early 1970s to 
the early 1990s. This indicated that in 1993 the total OECD 
manufacturing imports from developing countries amounted to 
approximately US$ 150 billion (in 1985 prices). However, the 
corresponding exports from the OECD to developing countries totalled 
nearly US$ 250 billion, yielding a net OECD surplus of nearly US$ 100 
billion. As a proportion of GDP, the OECD surplus was about 1 per cent, 
approximately the same as two decades earlier in 1974. Disaggregation 
of the OECD figures suggests important intercountry and interregional 
differences. The European Union’s manufacturing trade balance with 
developing countries followed much the same pattern as that for the 
OECD as a whole. The situation, however, has been rather different with 
respect to the US and Japan: Japan’s trade balance with developing 
countries increased appreciably between 1974 and 1993, while that for 
the US fell over this period, becoming negative by the mid 1980s.
15
  
 
The industrial countries' surplus in manufacturing trade with developing 
countries has fluctuated in response to world economic events: it rose in 
the 1970s as developing countries borrowed petro-dollars and greatly 
increased their imports of capital goods from advanced countries. With 
the debt crisis engulfing many developing countries in the 1980s, the 
surplus fell. Importantly, this was due to reduced exports to the 
developing countries rather than to increasing imports from them.  In the 
first half of the 1990s, as economic growth in developing countries 
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revived, the surplus again rose as a result of increased Southern imports 
from the North.  
 
 Research indicates that neither mass unemployment nor the extent of de-
industrialization, that is, the fall in employment in manufacturing in G7 
advanced countries, are associated with fluctuations in this surplus but 
rather with cyclical and conjunctural movements in economic activity in 
these countries themselves.
16
 Thus, for example, the US was among those 
G7 industrial countries losing the least number of manufacturing jobs 
during this period whilst experiencing a trade deficit with developing 
countries.  
 
 The experience of the 1950s and 1960s on these issues is illuminating. 
Just as there had been a sharp increase in the import penetration of 
leading advanced country markets by manufactured imports from the 
South in the period 1974 to 1993, there was a similar fast increase in 
imports in the 1950s and 1960s into the US and the original six EEC 
member states from Japan and Italy (which could be regarded as 
developing countries in that period, much like the newly industrializing 
countries today)
17. However, this earlier acceleration in the North’s 
imports did not lead to mass unemployment, reduced real wages, or 
increased income inequality. Rather, European countries had full 
employment and, in the US, real wages grew at a rate of nearly 2 per cent 
a year and inequality decreased. The main difference between then and 
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the more recent period under discussion is that in the 1950s and 1960s 
advanced economies were growing at about 5 per cent a year compared 
with half that long-term rate since 1973. 
 
 Most economists recognize that the unfavourable labour market 
characteristics in advanced countries detailed in the last section (de-
industrialization, mass unemployment, and increased wage dispersion) 
are far-reaching economic and social phenomena that do not arise from a 
single cause. Although trade with developing countries may be one of the 
factors, there are additional interrelated factors that may be equally 
plausible and more important. These include trade imbalances between 
developed countries themselves, cyclical movements in economic 
activity and slow long-term growth in advanced countries, technical 
change, and changes in economic and social policy in these countries.  In 
practice it is difficult for economists to isolate and measure the influence 
of each of these possible causal factors and the considerable controversy 
over this matter is not surprising. 
18
  
 
 There is, however, agreement among mainstream economists that the 
proximate cause for these developments has been the diminished demand 
for unskilled labour.  This is deemed to have caused increased wage 
inequality in the US because labour markets there are flexible, whilst in 
Europe, because of the welfare state and more rigid labour markets, the 
effect is in terms of increased unemployment. Incorporating the decline 
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in the demand for unskilled labour, mass unemployment in Europe, and 
the increased wage dispersion in the US into a unified explanatory 
framework is referred to as the “transatlantic consensus”. (Atkinson, 
1999.)  
 
 The extent of the consensus is limited, however, to agreeing on the 
supposed fall in the demand for unskilled labour. As to what causes this 
fall in demand is subject to much debate. A large majority of mainstream 
specialists in this area attribute it mostly to technological progress that is 
biased in favour of those with more skills, rather than to trade with 
developing countries. (See footnote 14).  
 
 Some important research, however, criticizes the simple theoretical 
framework (the Hecksher-Ohlin two factor, two sector, two country 
model) normally used in mainstream approaches as being too limited or 
unreal. This two-by-two-by-two model for North-South trade, with the 
North specialising in skill intensive industries according to its 
comparative advantage and the South producing and exporting low-skill 
products, predicts that there will be a fall in the demand for unskilled 
labour leading to increased wage dispersion in the US and unemployment 
in Europe. However, a somewhat more realistic formal model within the 
same paradigm involving trade between three groups of countries (the 
US, Europe and the NICs) does not yield such predictions at all.
19
  
Furthermore, other economists put greater emphasis on the lack of reality 
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of the assumptions of the traditional trade models, namely the assumption 
of constant returns to scale, perfect competition and full employment, 
giving no consideration to demand side factors or to the accumulation of 
capital and therefore to growth. 
 
 Significantly, recent research also questions the underlying empirical 
generalisation on which the ‘transatlantic consensus’ is based, namely 
that there was a fall in the demand for unskilled labour in advanced 
economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter was inferred in the US, for 
example, from the fact that the relative wages of the unskilled workers 
fell relatively to those of skilled workers. The evidence for 1977 to 1987 
is broadly compatible with this proposition: the earnings of the bottom 
decile (assuming these to be unskilled workers), fell with respect to the 
median. However, importantly, the corresponding data for the US 
economy for the period 1987 to 1997 suggests an opposite trend, that is, 
the ratio of the bottom decile rose in relation to the median. Similarly, 
wage differentials in the UK fell in the 1990s, in contrast to the 1980s 
when these rose substantially.  
 
In short, research suggests that traditional trade models are not applicable and that the 
basic premise regarding a decline in the demand for unskilled labour cannot empirically 
be sustained for the 1990s. It also suggests that the principle explanations put forward 
for the ostensible fall in aggregate demand, namely technological change and trade, are 
not sufficient to account for the broader observed facts regarding increased inequality in 
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incomes in general. Indeed, Atkinson (1999) pointed out that what was observed in 
many countries in the 1990s was not a decline in wages at the bottom end of the scale 
but rather a rise at the very top. This suggests the need to look to wider explanations. 
Indeed, the trend in the 1990s can be considered in part the result of new economic 
policies that reflected changing public perceptions of what is socially acceptable, rather 
than being entirely the result of economic factors, such as technological change or trade. 
In recent decades economists have tended to overlook the fact that labour markets are 
unlike product markets.  In the real world, even the most flexible labour markets require 
social agreement on the fairness of wage and income differentials.  How these norms 
are arrived at is a complex social and political process.    
 
The limitations of the theoretical framework of mainstream models on the subject are 
further highlighted by considering the effects of the 1990s Asian economic crisis on 
unemployment levels in advanced countries. In the late 1990s it was widely thought that 
the considerable fall in the price of manufactured exports from the Asian crisis countries 
consequent on devaluation would lead to a further net loss in US jobs.  This, however, 
did not occur, as indicated by rising levels of employment, particularly among the 
unskilled. In fact it can be argued that these exports from crisis-affected Asian countries 
helped increase rather than decrease employment to the extent that they exerted 
downward pressure on wages and prices and hence lessened inflationary pressure. This 
enabled the Federal Reserve to allow the US economy to operate at a higher level of 
economic activity and employment than would otherwise have been possible.  Thus, 
while the direct effect of reduced wages in the crisis-affected Asian countries on US 
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employment may have been expected to be negative, once indirect effects are taken into 
account, the result was very different.  
 
To sum up, analysis and evidence indicate that trade with developing countries does not 
necessarily lead either to unemployment or low real wages for workers in advanced 
countries. Between 1950 and 1970, despite the rapid increase in imports from the then 
NICs (newly industrializing countries), European countries enjoyed full employment 
and rising real wages. In the US, real wages grew rather than remaining stagnant as they 
were later. Income inequality and wage dispersion became less in both Europe and the 
US, unlike in the following period. Although there are many factors that could explain 
the differences, a very important cause was the much faster economic growth in 
Northern economies in the earlier period. Even those economists who believe that there 
is a tendency for the trade between rich and poor countries to be detrimental to unskilled 
workers will recognize that this tendency can be overwhelmed by the “lift all boats” 
effects of faster economic growth. (Bhagwati, 1994.)   
 
Considered in these terms, even if there were some significant adverse labour market 
outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s of trade with the South, these could have been 
overridden by faster economic growth.  However, the slower economic growth observed 
in advanced economies in these decades resulted from their own policy decisions and 
social and political dynamics. (Glyn et. al., 1990; Crafts and Toniolo, 1996.)  It did not 
result from manufacturing trade with developing countries.  
 
  17 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the empirical evidence for the 1990s, contradicts 
the key theoretical expectation of those mainstream economists who believe that trade 
with the South necessarily leads to a fall in the demand for unskilled labour.  
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IV. LABOUR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The previous section considered the North’s apprehensions that unemployment and 
increasing inequality in advanced countries were due to competition from developing 
country imports. The discussion concluded that this was neither a necessary outcome nor 
did the analysis of recent developments prove these apprehensions to be well founded.  
 
This section considers the implications of imposing compulsory labour standards on 
developing countries. This is a complex question, with many layers of argument, which 
requires a careful and extensive analysis. However, the analysis of these issues here will be 
necessarily brief.  
 
In advocating a social clause or other mechanisms to enforce labour standards advanced 
countries suggest that they are only asking developing countries to adopt core labour 
standards, and not measures such as minimum wages. The former relate to the core 
conventions concerning freedom of association and collective bargaining, freedom from 
forced labour, non-discrimination and the abolition of child labour. This is justified on the 
grounds that they are basic human rights and hence no other considerations enter the 
picture. It is argued, further, that the enforcement of core labour standards will not, in any 
case, alter developing countries’ comparative advantage in production and trade.20 There 
is, of course, a whole host of ‘other’ labour standards, but in the context of fierce 
international competition and developing countries the most likely ones at issue would 
include minimum wages, employment guarantees and health and safety measures.  
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This perspective raises two issues that need to be addressed here in view of their 
importance for developing countries. The first concerns the suggestion that the 
implementation of core standards has no impact on wage levels and other labour costs. The 
second concerns the primacy of core labour standards, and whether their classification as 
human rights completely rules out any discussion of the best way to proceed to implement 
them. 
 
IV. 1 Economic costs and benefits of core labour standards 
While the implementation of core labour standards in developing countries will not 
necessarily affect the costs and pattern of production directly, a little reflection will show 
that the indirect effects may be quite important, and these could involve not just economic 
costs but also economic benefits. Further, the costs and benefits of implementing core 
labour standards are likely to be different for each of the various labour standards. It is also 
important to appreciate that the costs and benefits would be different if some or all of these 
core standards were to be implemented simultaneously. For example, the costs to 
producers of introducing equality of remuneration or non-discrimination in employment 
are likely to be higher if workers also have the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
To illustrate and clarify the main issues involved, the focus in the following discussion will 
first be on freedom of association and on free collective bargaining. Subsequently other 
labour standards, particularly that of the elimination of child labour, will be briefly 
considered.  
 
The contention that the implementation of the two core standards under discussion here 
(freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining -- Conventions No. 87 and 
98), will have no economic consequences for producers or to the economy as a whole is 
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not generally valid. At an elementary level, the mainstream textbook model of perfect 
competition would posit that the introduction of these standards would be distortionary as 
this will lead to monopsony in the labour market and thus to a misallocation of resources. 
This is, of course, a static analysis based on a rather restricted set of assumptions and one 
can envisage a dynamic model of the economy in which labour standards reduce conflict 
by providing an institutionalized way of minimizing disruption, improving co-operation 
between the employees and employers and thereby encouraging the latter to invest more. 
This would generate greater growth in the national economy.
21
  
 
While theoretically possible, such a model with positive effects on economic development 
does not correspond to the economic conditions of most developing countries. In the longer 
term, however, when a higher level of development and a more advanced economic and 
institutional structure has been attained, the economic impact of employers’ and workers’ 
associations is more likely to be favourable. 
 
There are a number of reasons for expecting negative effects in the short to medium term 
for developing countries resulting from the compulsory introduction of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, according to the terms of ILO Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98. The most important of these are outlined below. 
  
IV 1a The structure of the economy 
Most developing countries are not only poor but have a sharply dualistic economic 
structure, extreme segmentation of the labour market, and surplus labour. In the mid-
1990’s, on average, only a small proportion of developing countries’ labour force (15 per 
cent) had employment in industry and services in which they had a formal wage contract. 
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For this segment of the labour force it is feasible to consider applying core ILO labour 
standards. In contrast, however, 61 per cent of the labour force works in agriculture and 
another 22 per cent in rural non-farm and urban informal employment. (World Bank, 
1995.) Even for the urban sector alone, UNDP (2000) reports that, in the 1990s, informal 
work accounted for 57 per cent of urban employment in Bolivia, 56 per cent in Tanzania 
and 48 per cent in Thailand.  
 
In general, improvements in labour standards, core or otherwise, of this often considerable 
portion of the labour force in agriculture and the informal sector in developing countries 
depends on significant changes being made in economic structure. Labour standards 
improve as the proportion of the labour force in these two sectors declines while that in 
organized industry and the formal service sector, where labour standards are more likely to 
be observed or enforced, rise.
22
 Fast economic growth may speed up the process of 
structural change but can also be associated with jobless growth in the industrial sector. 
(For a further discussion, see Section V below). 
 
It is difficult to introduce and almost impossible to enforce ILO Conventions on this large 
part of the labour force. The vast majority of labour in these sectors gains a living in micro-
enterprises including subsistence agriculture, which creates obvious problems of 
organizing labour and monitoring standards. Further, in the more populous developing 
countries, there invariably exists a large reserve army of unskilled low-productivity labour 
that has to make ends meet by any means. In effect there is a large reserve of labour in 
search of work at any price. The possibilities for unionization and collective bargaining of 
the sort traditionally associated with the advanced industrial economies are limited. With 
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deindustrialization and the rise of the service economy, even the advanced industrial 
countries are now confronted with this problem once again.
23
  
 
1b Autocratic employers and immature trade unions  
As will be explained in the following section, freedom of association and collective 
bargaining in advanced countries has developed through an evolutionary process over a 
period of well over a century. In the course of this evolution the unions and employers 
developed responsible institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution. Employers 
themselves came to appreciate the advantages of trade unions and collective representation 
for the workers. On the union side wasteful and damaging inter-union rivalry and other 
dysfunctional features of early trade unions were curbed, and in many industrial countries 
centralized wage bargaining or other similar pay co-ordinating structures were put in place. 
 
However, if in accordance with the advanced countries’ proposals, the two labour 
conventions under discussion are imposed in a “big bang” manner in a developing 
economy (through, for example, international trade sanctions), it is more than likely that 
this would lead not to conflict resolution, but rather to strikes and consequent economic 
disruption. Many developing country employers, including the largest ones, often have a 
feudal or paternalistic outlook and do not see any need for trade unions.  It is not unusual 
for them to use violent methods to stop the formation of unions and their activities, much 
like the historical experience of advanced countries such as the US.  On the side of the 
employees, in the early stages of unionization there is also likely to be considerable inter-
union competition for members, leading to populist positions being taken by union leaders.  
Further, attempts at violent suppression of trade union activity by employers invariably 
leads to counter violence by unions.  The consequent economic and social disruption 
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discourages investment, both foreign and domestic, and therefore does not help the cause 
of economic development. 
 
Moreover, free collective bargaining between employers and unions, if it takes place at all, 
will only be concerned with the wages and employment of those who are already working 
in the formal sector.  The interests of the vast majority of workers in agriculture and in the 
informal sector who are not unionized would be ignored.  Further, to the extent that formal 
sector unions succeed in getting higher wages and employment guarantees for their 
members, this is likely to reduce, other things being equal, the demand for labour in that 
sector, forcing the unemployed to seek work in the informal sector. So the paradoxical 
result of efforts to impose compulsory labour standards is that it would harm economic 
development, reduce structural change, and thereby increase the numbers in the informal 
sector where labour standards hardly apply. 
 
Thus, the compulsory introduction of free collective bargaining, if successfully 
implemented, is likely to widen the already considerable wage and income gap between 
workers in different parts of the economy. Instead of promoting equality and solidarity, the 
unintended result of unionization of formal sector employees may well be the development 
of an aristocracy of labour based on extraction of rents by union members, particularly in 
more productive firms. In these circumstances a concern for broad social justice, especially 
with respect to the informal sector and small rural producers, may require government 
intervention and regulation of bargaining between unions and employers in the formal 
sector (see, for example, Stiglitz 2000). Such intervention may also be necessary to cope 
with the adverse economic and social consequences of bargaining between autocratic 
management and immature unions as outlined above. However, many developed country 
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governments lack the institutional and administrative capacity for adequate remedial 
intervention with unfavourable consequences for economic development.
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The paradoxical results of the enforcement of compulsory labour standards go further. 
Such enforcement would not only be counter-productive for developing countries, it is also 
unlikely to help the interests of those seeking protection in the advanced countries. To see 
this, assume that the imposition of labour standards leads, via trade union action, to higher 
wages and costs in the developing country’s export sector – the most favourable 
assumption from the protectionist perspective in the advanced countries. Under this 
assumption, the competitiveness of developing country exports is likely to diminish, but 
this may provide only a brief respite for the advanced country producers. 
 
In analysing this issue, it is useful to remember that most developing country exports to 
advanced countries are produced by a relatively small though growing number of NICs, 
whilst the vast majority of developing countries export only a very small fraction of the 
total. Although, in the short run, all countries are likely to be disadvantaged to a greater or 
lesser extent in terms of their competitiveness if core labour standards are made 
compulsory, the NICs are unlikely to be handicapped for long. As they have higher rates of 
investment, technological change and superior production and export dynamics, they will, 
in the medium term, be able to re-establish their competitiveness. The outstanding 
examples of this phenomenon are countries like Korea and indeed before then the example 
of Japan that started with Asian wage levels and has continued to be competitive in spite of 
continuing increases in real wages, as well as more and more stringent environmental 
standards imposed on their exports by importing countries. Higher labour costs in firms 
already competing in world markets are likely to stimulate investment in more productive 
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techniques in order to maintain their competitive edge. China and India are current 
examples of this process.    
 
However, turning from the NICs to the great majority of developing countries, although 
accounting for only a small proportion of total developing country manufactured exports to 
advanced countries, these exports are, nevertheless, crucial to their well being.  A rise in 
their export costs as a result of the compulsory introduction of labour standards would, 
under plausible assumptions, lead to a lower rate of economic growth of exports in both the 
short and medium term, worsening their balance of payments, such that the growth rate has 
to be lower to be compatible with current account equilibrium. This will reduce the pace of 
structural change and the improvement of labour standards. 
 
It will be appreciated, however, that both for the NICs and other developing countries the 
costs of adjustment, whether in the short or long term will be lower, the faster the rate of 
economic growth of production and exports in the domestic and in the world economy.
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V  LABOUR STANDARDS:THE EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
It is interesting in this respect to reflect on the actual experience of East Asian and Latin 
American countries during the course of economic development. Taking East Asia first, 
notwithstanding the recent Asian crisis, these ‘miracle’ countries experienced very fast 
long-term growth (near double-digit rates for two decades or more). The result has been 
fast absorption of surplus labour resulting in labour shortages; very high rates of growth of 
real wages by comparative international standards; speedy structural change, resulting in 
the displacement of the informal sector activities by the formal sector. Real wages in the 
fast growing East Asian and South East Asian economies rose at a rate of over 5 per cent a 
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year between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s.
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  In Taiwan, employment in the 
agricultural sector fell from 56.1 per cent in 1953 to 36.7 per cent in 1970 and was only 
12.1 per cent in 1993. Industrial employment reached more than 40 per cent in 1990.  In 
Korea in 1992, only about 15 per cent of the labour force were still in the agricultural 
sector and more than 25 per cent in the industrial sector. (Lee and Park, 1995.) 
 
It is a matter of historical record that many of these countries repressed trade unions during 
the early phases of their developmental spurt. This was the case for example in Korea 
during the 1960s and 1970s. However, with the fast expansion of the formal economy and 
particularly the shrinking of the informal sector, not only labour standards in terms of 
employment and wages greatly improved, there was also a very considerable expansion of 
unionization. By the end of the 1980s, 40 per cent of the labour force in Taiwan and 17.2 
per cent in Korea were unionized, compared to only 15 per cent in the US. (Lee and Park, 
1995.) These huge improvements in core as well as other labour standards took place in 
these countries through the process of economic development itself, without any 
international coercion.  
 
A comparison of East Asian countries with those elsewhere (for example, in South Asia or 
Latin America) suggests that fast economic growth may not be a sufficient, but is certainly 
a necessary, condition for the speedy establishment and improvement of labour standards. 
To illustrate, a democratic country like India in the 1950s had much better core labour 
standards in the formal sector than say, Korea; but the situation is now quite the reverse. 
The proportion of the workforce in unions is much smaller than that in Korea, and 
workers’ wages in India have grown much more slowly. Similarly, in Latin America, 
despite its long history of trade unionism compared with East Asia, its much slower long-
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term rate of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to further 
‘informalization’ of the economy.27 Tokman (1997) reported that eight out of every 10 new 
jobs in Latin America in the 1990s have been created in the informal sector with 
consequent unfavourable prospects for the workers involved to be able to exercise the 
rights given to them by the ILO conventions. A small proportion of the increase in 
informal sector work could be due to labour saving technical progress in the formal sector, 
rather than to slower growth. However, it is too early to tell whether the long-term 
relationship between economic growth and formal jobs has become worse over time.  
 
There are a number of reasons why improved core and other labour standards are 
associated with structural change and particularly with industrialization. In the first 
instance, in contrast with the small-scale agricultural sector and the informal sector, work 
in industry is usually organized in a way that facilitates trade union organization and 
activities. The relatively higher rate of growth of productivity in industry also provides 
scope for improvements in substantive labour standards. Employers in the industrial sector 
who have invested substantial capital in the enterprise are also interested in promoting core 
and other labour standards such as health and safety standards since these tend to increase 
the level of commitment of the workforce and to increase the productivity of workers. (See 
further Piore (1990). 
 
 V.1 Core Labour Standards and Human Rights 
The subsections above considered some of the most important costs and benefits of 
implementing the core labour standards relating to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, and the appropriateness of such standards in the circumstances in which most 
developing countries find themselves. 
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This sub-section addresses the other central issue introduced at the beginning of the 
section, namely that concerning the primacy given to core labour standards, which have 
been accorded the status of human rights.  
 
The unanimous adoption by ILO members in 1998 of the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, embodying the seven core labour standards, is regarded as 
evidence of the widespread acceptance of the notion that certain labour standards have 
precedence. The rationale given for the primacy of the seven core standards is that they are 
universal human rights. Of these the freedom of association and trade union rights are 
given particular emphasis in that they give workers the freedom to pressure for 
improvements in other aspects of labour standards. Having the status of human rights 
purportedly pre-empts any economic cost-benefit analysis. These contentions are contested 
below. 
 
Historical evolution of labour standards in advanced countries 
Historically, labour standards evolved in a rather different manner. In Europe, early efforts 
to improve labour standards focused on gaining legislation to eliminate the worst forms of 
child and female labour, and with initiatives to improve health and safety at work. It took 
many decades before workers’ efforts to associate and bargain with their employers gained 
legal recognition. In many countries, it was only after many decades of struggle and 
political debate that trade unions were recognized and constituted a regulated institutional 
framework facilitating conflict resolution between employers and workers. Thus, broadly 
speaking, core and substantive labour standards evolved during the course of economic 
development, and legislation legitimizing labour standards was introduced as a result of 
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struggle by working people, and not through some deus ex machina. Labour standards 
have been both the cause and effect of democratization in the advanced countries.
28
 In the 
light of this evolution, the unions became increasingly responsible and both economic 
growth and labour standards improved.  
 
A Hierarchy of labour rights? 
Although these two core standards concerning the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining are indeed extremely important and should be given high status, the primacy of 
those over non-core standards needs to be questioned. For example, should health and 
safety at work be accorded lower priority than the right to free association and collective 
bargaining? It is indeed true that ‘deficits’ in the latter have often resulted in the 
imprisonment and even murder of trade unionists. On the other hand, the disregard for the 
health and lives of workers manifested by the widespread lack of health and safety 
regulations has resulted in appalling tragedies such as those in the Bangkok factory and the 
Bhopal chemicals plant in which fires and fumes cost the lives of thousands of workers. 
Less dramatically but more insidiously, tens of thousands of unprotected agricultural 
workers worldwide suffer slow poisoning by the chemicals used to produce agricultural 
exports. 
 
Equally importantly, there is international recognition of the fact that absolute poverty 
blights the lives of over one billion people in developing countries. In 1995, 117 Heads of 
State or Government attending the Copenhagen Social Summit endorsed the Copenhagen 
Declaration, which put primary emphasis on the promotion of full employment and 
poverty reduction.  Should not the right to a decent living also be regarded as a basic 
labour right?  
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V. 2 Terms of Conventions 87 and 98 and the role of the government 
There are also serious difficulties from the point of view of developing countries with the 
precise formulations of Conventions 87 and 98 concerning freedom of association, the 
right to organize and to engage in free collective bargaining. The texts of these 
Conventions reflect the needs and institutions of advanced countries at a particular moment 
in time. The conventions do not take into account the fact that untrammelled collective 
bargaining may not only lead to social disruption as noted above, but also to serious 
macro-economic disequilibria, all of which require government intervention in the 
bargaining process. Governments also need to intervene to ensure that the interests of the 
unemployed, low productivity sector workers or those in the informal sector or small-scale 
agriculture are taken into account. These concerns were recognized in European countries 
themselves during the so-called “Golden Age” (1950-1973) when many governments 
entered into social pacts with unions and employers to institutionalize the social market 
economy, which tried to achieve a broadly acceptable distribution of income and wealth.
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(Glynn, et al. (1990), Eichengreen (1996), Flanagan (1999)). 
 
Moreover, the orthodox approach to trade unions implied in the terms of the two 
Conventions is hardly relevant to peasant and small-scale farming in developing countries. 
These require different policies and institutions in which the government often plays a role, 
as for example, through price support programmes, technical assistance and promoting co-
operatives.  Some of these measures may be achieved through individual and collective 
initiatives and organizations, but in practice the government has to play a leading role.  In 
developing country agriculture, one of the main issues is land reform, since the size of land 
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holding is a crucial factor in determining the capacity to earn a decent living and escape 
poverty.  
 
It would appear that human rights defined and interpreted in terms of these two core 
Conventions are destined only for a small part of the working population, benefiting 
mainly those who are already relatively privileged. Furthermore, the untrammelled 
exercise of these rights by the minority may well prejudice the chance for others to have a 
decent living or to be able to exercise their rights to freedom of association and to 
collective bargaining.    
 
VI   SHOULD CORE CONVENTIONS BE MADE COMPULSORY? 
To sum up, from the perspective of developing countries, there are three significant policy 
conclusions with respect to the core Conventions: 
 
 The number of core Conventions should be expanded to make them inclusive 
and relevant to the needs of the whole working population worldwide; 
 Conventions No. 87 and 98 require fundamental revision to make them relevant 
to the developing world. 
 There are trade-offs between certain core conventions and therefore economic 
and social costs and benefits must be part of the moral equation.  
 
These conclusions also have important implications for the question whether core labour 
standards should be made mandatory by means of international trade sanctions or other 
punitive measures; these implications are examined below. 
 
  32 
In the case of Conventions 87 and 98, the answer suggested by the above analysis is 
unambiguous. These conventions are deeply flawed, particularly from a developing 
country perspective, and it would be a mistake for developing countries to implement them 
in the fashion envisaged in the conventions. The argument here is not against workers’ 
organizations as such, but the process of raising labour standards should ensure the 
inclusion of the mass of the working population. If these conventions were revised to make 
them more inclusive, developing countries would find them easier and more useful to 
implement. However, their mandatory application in developing countries under 
international coercion would still be unwise. This is because, although the acceptance of 
the role of the government in the collective bargaining process may help ameliorate some 
of the difficulties outlined earlier, there are still likely to be significant costs for the non-
NIC majority of developing countries. Consequently, compulsory standards such as these 
will be resisted by these countries. However, encouragement to these countries through 
non-coercive means and technical assistance by agencies such as the ILO to implement the 
standards are more likely to lead to positive results. (Bhagwati, 1994). 
 
The arguments for compulsory implementation of labour standards in developing countries 
are sometimes based on advanced country allegations of the former’s unfair advantages in 
trade that give rise to social dumping and race to the bottom. These issues will be 
examined in the next section where it will be seen that these considerations also do not in 
any way justify compulsion. 
 
Although we argue here against compulsory imposition of Conventions 87 and 98, we do 
not take the same view for all other core conventions. For example, granting slave and 
bonded labour their freedom in recognition of their human rights should be implemented 
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forthwith. In view of the limited numbers of people involved, compulsion cannot be 
rejected on grounds of costs to developing countries. However, in the case of the 
Conventions on child labour, which we discuss briefly below, again compulsion will not be 
appropriate. 
 
Child labour 
Child labour (covered by a core ILO Convention (No. 138 on Minimum Age) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, which amplifies the 
former) raises other kinds of problems, which merit careful consideration.
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 The latter 
Convention commits countries to working with the ILO to fix time-bound policies to 
eliminate the worst forms of child labour. As is increasingly recognized, the phenomenon 
of child labour is rooted in a number of fundamental factors, not least domestic and global 
policies that lead to income concentration, poverty, exclusion, under-employment and 
unemployment.  The World Confederation of Labour (WCL) notes that, to abolish child 
labour, to prevent such situations arising, and to reintegrate children into society “requires 
a broad-based strategy. …. Free compulsory and high-quality education is a pre-requisite 
for concrete results of such a strategy … and has to include curricula for vocational 
training, which is now lacking in many countries.”  (WCL, 1997.) 
 
The essential point is that parents and governments in developing countries would like 
their children to be in school rather than at work, but in many poor countries they are 
unable to afford it. Detailed empirical studies from several countries confirm this view. 
(See, for example, Grootaert, 1998 and Addison et. al., 1997. For a recent review of these 
and other studies see Basu, 1999.) 
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Empirical evidence further suggests that, where parents have been compensated for the 
loss of children’s earnings and schools, children do not work but go to school.  A 
prominent and highly successful example is the government’s massive Bolsa Familia 
programme in Brazil. However, without such compensations for the parents, the imposition 
of the standard of child labour will simply lead to the children resorting to other often 
illegal or unsavoury activities, where they will be worse off than if they were working and 
earning some income for the family.  Thus, without supporting measures, the enforcement 
of the child labour Conventions in developing countries will hinder rather than help the 
realisation of the objective of promoting the welfare of children.
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VII CONCLUSION:  
An extremely important point that emerges from the discussion of core and other labour 
standards in this section is that substantial improvements in these standards, as well as 
significant growth of real wages and other substantive standards, can be rapidly achieved 
voluntarily through the process of economic development itself. As indicated, the fast 
growing East Asian countries were able to accomplish these objectives without any 
international enforcement measures.  
 
Efforts to enforce core labour standards will not help to raise standards in much of the 
informal sector and could well lead to further informalization.  If punitive trade measures 
were used to enforce such standards, a reduction in trade through the application of trade 
sanctions could result in cuts in employment precisely in the industries where labour 
standards have generally been seen to grow fastest.  This is likely to throw more workers 
into the informal sector, worsening the already low levels of remuneration and conditions 
of work.  The net result will be the opposite of what is allegedly intended. 
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This is not to say that leaving it to the market or to the natural forces of economic 
development will always be adequate to improve labour standards at a fast enough rate.  
The promotion of labour standards on a voluntary basis, backed up with technical and 
financial assistance for both the monitoring and implementing of the standards by the 
countries themselves, will be helpful in hastening the process. As explained before, 
developing countries have continually demonstrated their commitment to raising their 
labour standards, as manifested by various national and multilateral actions, including their 
recent acceptance of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and Their Follow-Up. (For the text, see ILO, 2000a, and for the Follow-Up, see ILO 
2000b).  In addition to the economic and practical arguments outlined above, they strongly 
object, however, on political grounds, to labour standards being made compulsory, whether 
the compulsion is enforced through the WTO or through joint ILO/WTO initiatives.  Such 
measures would introduce yet a further layer of conditionalities to those already imposed 
on them by the international financial institutions and through the Uruguay Round trade 
and trade-related agreements in the WTO, all of which circumscribe developing countries’ 
policy options in one way or another.  (South Centre, 1998a and 1998b.) 
 
The current ILO approach to labour standards seems to be more promising for the purpose 
of establishing a universal social floor for the globalizing economy. It focuses on the 
notion of ‘decent work’ as a means of capturing and realizing the aspirations of people 
throughout the world and seeking radically new solutions to the global problems of poverty 
and the working poor. At the opening session of the 88
th
 ILO Conference in June 2000, 
ILO’s Director General declared that decent work “… is not a straitjacket, a one-size-fits-
all solution". On the contrary, it is a way of treating in a coherent and dynamic way the 
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aspirations and goals of different individuals, different cultures, different societies.  The 
question is how to make it real.  We all understand that the possibilities for decent work 
evolve with social and economic progress, and goals can and should rise over time.”  
(Somavia, 2000) 
 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that the 
economic interests of informal sector low-productivity labour and those of the small-scale 
farming families must be promoted by other methods, including the development of 
popular organizations. The above analysis would also suggest that there is a clear need to 
redraft Conventions 87 and 98 so that they lead to more democratic outcomes in the sense 
of taking into account the conditions and economic structures of developing countries. The 
core standards could also be extended to include one focusing on the right to a decent 
living. 
 
Addendum 
Since the earlier version of this work was published the process of globalisation has 
advanced significantly and is acknowledged to be having both a positive and negative 
impact on most countries and regions.  There are both winners and losers. Until the start of 
the current acute economic crisis that began with the demise of Lehman Brothers, the 
world economy was expanding rapidly:  the rate of expansion was over 5 per cent per 
annum between 2003 and 2007.  While the US among developed countries, and China and 
India among developing countries, were the most successful in terms of economic growth 
they were not so successful in improving income distribution. (However, there is no 
evidence that slower growing economies were better in this respect.) In this brief 
addendum we provide an overview of the evolution of labour markets and labour standards 
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in these three countries and examine the implications of North-South interactions during 
this period of fast economic growth for workers in the North and South.   
 
Taking first the case of the US, its economy enjoyed near full employment in the 2000s.  
The burst of the dot.com bubble at the beginning of 2000 was followed by fast economic 
recovery and with the achievement of near full employment and public concern over 
labour standards in developing countries waned. It has however resurfaced with the current 
acute economic crisis and the resultant mass unemployment.
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 The Obama administration, 
to its credit, has not accepted labour unions’ demands for protection but instead has 
outlined a positive programme of the doubling of US exports over the next 5 years. In the 
context of the current downturn in the world economy it remains to be seen how realistic 
this plan is likely to be. 
 
Among developing countries, current fast growth of over 10 per cent in China and 9 per 
cent in India has led to considerable reductions in poverty in both countries and to 
substantial improvements in levels of employment and to improvements in labour 
standards, without coercive multilateral pressures. Nevertheless, the Obama administration 
is subject to pressure from trade unions to strengthen the labour standard dimensions of 
bilateral trade and development agreements between the US and developing countries.    
 
Recent evidence suggests that labour standards in both China and India have improved as a 
result of labour pressures, as well as the structural change brought about by government 
policies promoting fast economic growth. Hundreds of millions of rural workers in both 
countries have found work in the cities. Their labour standards may be expected to 
improve, as in the case of East Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s, when labour 
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standards improved rapidly in tandem with the increasing demand for non-agricultural 
labour. At the same time, economic growth in China and India has, inter alia, increased 
demand for imports from the US and elsewhere and hence reduced US financial deficits.  
 
However, as Izurieta and Singh (2010) point out, fast growth in India and China is not an 
unalloyed good for the US economy and its workers. These countries’ growth entails 
increased demand for imported energy and other raw materials, pushing world commodity 
prices sky high. Their simulation analysis based on an econometric model of the world 
economy suggests that fast Indian growth at 9 per cent per annum and Chinese growth at 
10 per cent per annum is not compatible with a full employment level of growth of 3 per 
cent a year in the US. Were the US to have full employment growth, India and China could 
only grow at less than their desired rates of growth. The Izurieta and Singh analysis 
indicates that this conflict of interest can only be resolved by means of close cooperation 
between the three countries in energy conservation and environmental measures. Such a 
scenario will inevitably benefit labour markets and standards in both rich and poor 
countries particularly in the medium and long term. Moreover, in an increasingly 
integrated world economy, international economic and technical cooperation is essential if 
continued recession is to be averted. Further, the full potential of globalization in terms of 
improved labour standards and greater equality can only be achieved if there is greater 
policy coordination between nation states. Globalization left only to market forces cannot 
deliver worldwide full employment or decent livelihoods for the entire workforce.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The pressure on large northern companies at the top of value chains to keep their final prices low, and their 
substantial power to keep down the prices of their suppliers, makes them complicit in the continuation of low 
labour standards in developing countries. (Zammit, 2010.)  
2
 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see Singh and Zammit (2000) 
3
 A particular complaint is that the employment of forced labour and child labour facilitates the payment of 
extremely low wages, if any, thereby putting pressure on other segments of the labour market to accept low 
wages.  
4
The necessary rights are those specified in ILO Conventions 87 and 98, granting workers the right to 
organize and to engage in free collective bargaining.  
5
 The basic source for the data in the following paragraphs is the US Council of Economic Advisers (1998) 
and Economic Policy Institute (1999). 
6
 For an analysis of the evolution of the world economy between 1973 and 1979 (the so-called “inter-shock 
period” see Glyn et al. (1990). 
7
 On the issue of forced labour, the requirement that prisoners and youths in detention work for derisory pay 
is standard practice in the US and in Europe. In the US, the prison population numbers over 1 million while 
half a million in local county jails. There is a disproportionate number of black and latino persons, often 
detained for minor offences and arguably as a form of social control  (See, for example, Freeman 1995). 
Prisoners are forced to work in factories, including clothing factories that have located their operations to 
prison sites, where they have a captive pool of cheap labour. It is estimated that in 1998 prison labour 
produced over 280 products worth over US$ 9 billion and replaced 400,000 jobs otherwise done by the 
normal workforce. Prison labour is paid the minimum wage but, after deductions for taxes, room and board, 
victims compensation etc. the pay may be only US$ 60 a month for nine-hour days. A number of harsh 
disciplinary measures and other penalties are imposed if prisoners refuse to work. Federal law prohibits the 
domestic sale of prison-made goods unless prisoners are paid the going wage, so prison industries export the 
output, often to Asian countries. (WINDS.)  
8
 Unionization becomes particularly difficult when a considerable part of the workforce consists of illegal 
migrant labour, as is the case in parts of the USA. Employers are, of course, keen to employ such workers, 
since these are willing to work on almost any terms and in the worst of all possible jobs. However, the fear of 
being arraigned and deported as illegal migrants constrains them from joining efforts to unionize and 
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improve their terms and conditions of work. Inflows of migrant labour, legal or otherwise, are unlikely to dry 
up, until growth and development has improved the standard of living in the South.  
9
 The lower rate of unemployment in the US is partly explained by the fact that welfare provision for the 
unemployed is not as extensive as that in Europe, so that many people are obliged to seek work however 
unremunerative the wage. The higher level of unemployment in the EU compared with that in the US is the 
source of a vigorous academic and policy debate on labour market flexibility. 
10
 Since then unemployment levels have declined. The April 2000 figure for Sweden was 4.7 per cent and the 
average for the Euro-11, that is the members of the European single currency union, was 9.2 per cent. (The 
Economist, 2000.) 
11
 For research suggesting that trade with the South has a detrimental impact on employment and wages in 
the North, see in particular Wood (1994) and Wood (1995). However, Wood’s estimates of the extent of the 
impact far exceed those of other economists.  
12
 The analysis in this section is based on Singh and Dhumale (2000). For detailed empirical evidence 
underlying the arguments in paragraphs i-iv the reader is referred to UNCTAD (1995). 
13
 The bulk of developing country manufactured exports is accounted for by only thirteen developing 
countries, mainly in Asia, the percentage reaching 87.9 in 1996.
13
 (Ghose, 2000.) 
14
 Strictly speaking, under the rarified assumptions of general equilibrium trade models, it can be shown that 
small changes in quantities can cause large shifts in prices.  For the intense academic controversy on this 
subject, see Krugman (2000), Leamer (2000).  For earlier contributions, see Bhagwati (1994). 
15
 It is also important to bear in mind a related point with respect to the effects of trade on jobs. Once a 
country starts trading there will normally be a gross loss of jobs, but not necessarily a net loss. Other things 
being equal, employment will contract in importing and expand in exporting industries. The magnitude of the 
net change in jobs will be determined by the relative growth rates of imports and exports, as well as by the 
capital intensity of production in the importing and exporting industries. For the individuals concerned, the 
gross loss of jobs is extremely important as many of them may not have the skills or the capacity to move to 
jobs created elsewhere in the economy. Thus governments often need to provide special assistance to 
displaced workers. The US government, for example, provides trade adjustment grants to workers proven to 
have been displaced because of imports. 
16
 For a fuller discussion of deindustrialization, see Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997), Singh (1989 and 
1994) and Howes and Singh (2000). 
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17
 Between 1958 and 1997, import penetration by Italy and Japan of the market for manufactures for the 
original six EEC countries, excluding Italy, rose from 0.5 per cent to 3.7 per cent of apparent consumption 
(gross output minus net exports); the corresponding figures for the US were 0.3 to 1.8. This acceleration in 
the North’s imports is coincidentally similar to that experienced by these countries between 1975 and 1992. 
Over the latter period, the European Union’s manufactured imports from developing countries rose from 0.9 
to 2.8 per cent of apparent consumption. The analogous figures for the US for this later period were 0.8 and 
4.3. 
18
 For recent reviews of this literature, see Burtless (1995), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Slaughter and 
Swagel (1997).  See also Singh and Dhumale (2000), Atkinson (1999), Krugman and Lawrence, (1994),  
Richardson (1995). 
19
 See Atkinson (1999); Atkinson (2000); Davis (1998a) and Davis (1998b).  
20
 See, for example, the statement of US Secretary of Trade Barshefsky’s statement on this matter at the 
Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting. 
21
 The central question here is whether labour standards would help or hinder economic development, 
through their impact on the rate of growth of output, employment and labour costs. The general answer, as 
suggested by the analysis in the text, is that this depends on a number of complex factors and 
interrelationships, in particular the assumptions which are made with respect to a) the range of labour 
standards being introduced and the speed with which they are implemented; b) the level of development of 
the country and degree of export orientation; c) the dynamics of the production structure and production and 
export capabilities, including the ability to absorb modern technology; d) the rate of savings and investment 
among others. It may also be useful to note that this analysis of the relationship between labour standards and 
economic development is somewhat different to the examination of the effects of labour standards on 
economic welfare in terms of the conventional theories of welfare economics and international trade. For an 
example of the latter perspective see Brown et al., 1996. 
22
 Employment in the formal sector increases until a very high level of per capita income is reached. At that 
point, the share of employment in industry declines and that of services, particularly informal services 
(informal in the sense that many labour laws become difficult to apply due to the small size of the enterprise) 
begins to rise, as is indicated in the previous footnote. 
23
 The acquisition of labour rights and standards is not necessarily a permanent achievement. For example, 
the number of people employed in Indian restaurants in the United Kingdom now totals more than those in 
  49 
                                                                                                                                                    
coal mining, steel making and shipbuilding put together. These once dominant industries were noted for their 
strong unions with substantial collective bargaining capacity, which brought continual improvements in 
substantive labour standards. In contrast, work in the restaurant business, which has low productivity, is 
typified by its informal, part-time nature, and the level of union organization is low, as are labour standards. 
This needs to be distinguished from the growing phenomenon of ‘informalization’ of the work contract, 
whereby the nature of the ‘contract’ is such as to turn the ‘employee’ into a virtually self-employed person, 
with few if any labour rights.  
24
 Contrary to popular prejudice in advanced countries, most developing country governments are neither 
perverse nor wicked or worse.  Some in East and Southeast Asia have been recognized to be “developmental 
states” with an outstandingly successful record of close government involvement in the economy (see for 
example Amsden 1989, Singh 1995a, Wade 1990) Others, such as India, have been equally interventionist 
but have not been as successful.  The large majority of Third World governments are less effective with 
considerably lower levels of institutional and administrative capacity.  These governments may not always be 
multiparty democracies but it is important to recognize that they tend to be relatively ‘inclusive’, i.e. they 
cannot simply be regarded as representing the interest of employers. There are, of course, a small number of 
southern countries, which are totally corrupt, ineffective and non-inclusive, as was the case with Mobutu’s 
Congo, for example. For such countries, neither compulsory nor voluntary labour standards would help. 
25
For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh, 1990.   
26
 For further details, see Singh (2000). 
27
 The trend rate of growth of Latin American economies during the last 20 years has been only three per cent 
a year, compared with almost six per cent a year in the period 1950-1980 (Singh, 2000). 
28
 In the words of E. P. Thompson, studying the making of the English working class, “The working class did 
not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making.” See Thompson (1963) and 
Hobsbawm (1964).    
29
 The European Agricultural Policy (CAP) was originally intended to improve the livelihoods of small-scale 
farmers and agricultural workers.  
30
 According to the ILO (www.ilo.org/public/english/ipec) there are 250 million child labourers in the world 
including child domestic workers. Of these, “60-80 million at least … work in conditions which cripple their 
bodies, minds and souls, stunt their growth and shorten their lives.” Less than 5 per cent of these child 
labourers work in export industries. It is estimated that during the 1990s 300,000 were soldiers.  
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31
 Recent theoretical research suggests that, under certain special circumstances, particularly where children 
constitute a significant proportion of the work force, the banning of child labour could lead to a rise in adult 
wages, enabling poor households to do without the income from child labour. The author of this theoretical 
result himself observes that “This is unlikely to be true for very poor economies but maybe valid for better-
off countries.  Even so, one would need to do detailed empirical work to decide whether such a total ban is 
worthwhile.  The interesting insight the theory gives us here is to tell us that it may be so and to give hints as 
to the type of economy where this is likely.” (Basu, 1999.) 
32
 For an analysis of the causes of the current financial and economic crisis see Aiginger (2009), Solow 
(2010) and Singh and Zammit (2010). 
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